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Abstract
We consider sequential detection based on quantized data in the presence of eavesdropper. Stochastic
encryption is employed as a counter measure that flips the quantization bits at each sensor according to
certain probabilities, and the flipping probabilities are only known to the legitimate fusion center (LFC)
but not the eavesdropping fusion center (EFC). As a result, the LFC employs the optimal sequential
probability ratio test (SPRT) for sequential detection whereas the EFC employs a mismatched SPRT
(MSPRT). We characterize the asymptotic performance of the MSPRT in terms of the expected sample
size as a function of the vanishing error probabilities. We show that when the detection error probabilities
are set to be the same at the LFC and EFC, every symmetric stochastic encryption is ineffective in the
sense that it leads to the same expected sample size at the LFC and EFC. Next, in the asymptotic regime
of small detection error probabilities, we show that every stochastic encryption degrades the performance
of the quantized sequential detection at the LFC by increasing the expected sample size, and the expected
sample size required at the EFC is no fewer than that is required at the LFC. Then the optimal stochastic
encryption is investigated in the sense of maximizing the difference between the expected sample sizes
required at the EFC and LFC. Although this optimization problem is nonconvex, we show that if the
acceptable tolerance of the increase in the expected sample size at the LFC induced by the stochastic
encryption is small enough, then the globally optimal stochastic encryption can be analytically obtained;
and moreover, the optimal scheme only flips one type of quantized bits (i.e., 1 or 0) and keeps the other
type unchanged.
Index Terms
Stochastic encryption, quantized sequential detection, mismatched SPRT, stopping time, eavesdropper,
sensor networks.
2I. INTRODUCTION
Decentralized detection in sensor networks using quantized data has been extensively studied, see
[1]–[12] and references therein. The focus of this paper is on the sequential hypothesis testing in
a decentralized sensor network based on quantized sensor data. Specifically, each sensor sequentially
takes samples and then sends the binary quantized version of each sample to a legitimate fusion center
(LFC). The LFC performs the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) which is the optimal procedure for
sequential detection of binary hypotheses in the sense of minimizing the expected sample sizes required
for achieving the prescribed detection accuracy [13], [14].
Due to the broadcast nature of the communication links, the communications between sensors and the
LFC are inherently vulnerable to eavesdropping, and hence, sensor networks are susceptible to security
breach, which is an important problem especially when the network is part of a larger cyber-physical
system [15]–[17]. For instance, some nodes within a cognitive radio (CR) network may eavesdrop on the
transmissions from other nodes to the LFC, detect the vacant primary user channels, and encroach on
the vacant primary user channels without paying any participation costs to the network moderator [16].
Eavesdropping fusion centers (EFC) in sensor networks are generally modeled as unauthorized receivers
that passively wiretap communications between sensors and the LFC, have unbounded computational
power just like the LFC, and seek to compete against the LFC [17]. Due to the optimality of the SPRT,
it is natural for the EFC to also employ the SPRT to make its decision.
In order to mitigate the security threats, different approaches have been investigated in recent literature
such as stochastic encryption, artificial noise injection, and cooperative jamming, to name a few [16],
[17]. In particular, as a low-complexity physical-layer security technique, stochastic encryption [18]–
[20] can be employed at the sensors such that every quantized data is transformed according to certain
probabilistic rule before transmitted to the LFC. The probabilistic transformation is known only to the
LFC, and the EFC is completely ignorant of the existence of stochastic encryptions. It is worth mentioning
that employing stochastic encryptions is an easy way to provide physical layer security for sequential
detection with quantized data which does not introduce any communication overhead for the sensors and
has minimal processing requirements, rendering it scalable in terms of network size. In this paper, we
investigate the sequential detection performance of the EFC in the presence of stochastic encryption and
optimize the encryption scheme to maximize the difference between the expected sample sizes at the
EFC and LFC.
3A. Summary of Results
Since the EFC is unaware of the stochastic encryption, a mismatched SPRT (MSPRT) is employed at
the EFC. We characterize the expected sample size and the error probabilities of the MSPRT in terms of
the detection thresholds. We show that when the detection error probabilities are set to be the same at
the LFC and EFC, every symmetric stochastic encryption leads to the same expected sample size at the
LFC and EFC. In addition, the asymptotic analysis on the expected sample size in terms of the vanishing
error probabilities is provided, and the stark difference from the asymptotic performance of the SPRT
with no model mismatch is revealed. For example, the expected sample size of the SPRT is determined
by the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergences between the distributions under the two hypotheses, while the
expected sample size of the MSPRT is unrelated to the KL divergences.
Next, in the asymptotic regime of small error probabilities, we show that every stochastic encryption
degrades the performance of the quantized sequential detection at the LFC by increasing the expected
sample size, and the expected sample size required at the EFC is no fewer than that is required at the
LFC. Hence, symmetric stochastic encryptions are the least effective ones. Then the optimal stochastic
encryption is investigated in the sense of maximizing the difference between the expected sample sizes
required at the EFC and LFC. The optimization problem is nonconvex. However we show that if the
acceptable tolerance of the increase in the expected sample size at the LFC induced by the stochastic
encryption is small enough, then the globally optimal stochastic encryption can be analytically obtained.
Moreover, the optimal scheme only flips one type of quantized bits (i.e., 1 or 0) that has larger probability
and keeps the other type unchanged.
B. Related Works
The decentralized sequential detection in sensor networks using quantized data has been widely
investigated, see [4]–[12] for instance. However, to the best of our knowledge, stochastic encryption
for quantized sequential detection in the presence of eavesdroppers has not been considered.
Stochastic encryptions were originally proposed in [18] for physical-layer security in the context of
fixed-sample-size estimation problems with quantized data. For the fixed-sample-size hypothesis testing
in sensor networks, the joint design of the stochastic encryption and the LFC decision rule that minimizes
the LFC detection error probabilities subject to a constraint on the EFC error probabilities is studied in
[19]. Nonetheless, the design approach in [19] is ad hoc and results in a suboptimal stochastic encryption.
This design approach is made more rigorous in [20], where the optimal stochastic encryption is obtained
4with respect to the J-divergence which is adopted as the performance metric for both LFC and EFC.
However, the approach proposed in [20] cannot be applied to sequential detection.
From the EFC perspective, the stochastic encryption process can be treated as a malicious man-in-the-
middle attack [21]–[24], since the EFC is unaware of the probabilistic transformation of the quantized
sensor data. However, most existing works on the man-in-the-middle attacks focus on the fixed-sample-
size inference problems, and do not jointly consider the performance at the LFC and EFC.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The system model and stochastic encryption is
introduced in Section II. The performance of the mismatched SPRT employed by the EFC is analyzed
in Section III-B. In Section IV, the optimal stochastic encryption is pursued. Finally, Section V provides
our conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND STOCHASTIC ENCRYPTION
In this section, the system model and the stochastic encryption are introduced. The sequential decision
procedures adopted at the LFC and EFC are also specified.
A. Quantized Sequential Detection
Consider a sensor network consisting of an LFC and N spatially distributed sensors, which aims to
test between two hypotheses. Each sensor sequentially makes observations of a particular phenomenon.
Let x
(n)
k denote the k-th observation made at the n-th sensor. Under each hypothesis, the observations
{x
(n)
k }n,k are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) at each sensor and are
independent across sensors. We use f
(n)
0 (x) and f
(n)
1 (x) to denote the probability density functions
(pdf) of the observations under the two hypotheses, i.e., for all n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N} and for all k ∈ {1, 2, ...}
H0 : x
(n)
k ∼ f
(n)
0 (x) ,
and H1 : x
(n)
k ∼ f
(n)
1 (x) .
(1)
For each observation x
(n)
k , the n-th sensor first forms a one-bit summary message u
(n)
k by applying a
quantizer Qn(x) , 1{x∈Dn} with the quantization region Dn, i.e.,
u
(n)
k , Qn
(
x
(n)
k
)
∈ {0, 1}, (2)
and then sends u
(n)
k to the LFC.
It is clear that {u
(n)
k } are independent and identically distributed at each sensor and are independent
across sensors. Let pn and qn denote the probabilities of the event {u
(n)
k = 1} under the hypotheses H1
5and H0, respectively, i.e.
pn
∆
=
∫
x∈Dn
f
(n)
1 (x) dx and qn
∆
=
∫
x∈Dn
f
(n)
0 (x) dx. (3)
Then the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) of the quantized data u
(n)
k can be computed as
l
(n)
k =


ln
pn
qn
, if u
(n)
k = 1,
ln
1− pn
1− qn
, if u
(n)
k = 0.
(4)
With regard to the probabilities {pn} and {qn}, the following assumption is made throughout the paper.
Assumption 1. We assume that the local quantizers {Qn}
N
n=1 bring about pn = p > 0.5, qn = q < 0.5,
and p+ q = 1 for all n ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}.
It is worth mentioning that Assumption 1 is motivated by the classical problem of detecting the mean
shift in Gaussian noise [8], [25]. Specifically, assume the following model and equal priors on both
hypotheses
H0 : x
(n)
k = w
(n)
k ,
and H1 : x
(n)
k = θ + w
(n)
k ,
(5)
where θ is a deterministic quantity, and the independent noise w
(n)
k ∼ N (a, b
2). As claimed in [8], in
the sense of minimizing the expected sample size at the LFC, the one-bit optimal threshold quantizer
at each sensor is symmetric, i.e., Dn = {x
(n)
k : x
(n)
k ≥ a+
θ
2}, if a prescribed upper bound on the false
alarm and miss probabilities is given. By employing this quantizer at each sensor, it is easy to show that
all conditions in Assumption 1 are satisfied.
We assume that the LFC can reliably receive the quantized data from the sensors. While sequentially
receiving the quantized data from the sensors, the LFC implements a sequential decision procedure to
test between the hypotheses in (1). Besides the LFC, there exists an EFC in the sensor system which is
able to wiretap the quantized sensor data transmitted from the sensors to the LFC, and the EFC also aims
to perform sequential detection between the hypotheses in (1). Our goal is to design a strategy at the
sensors to transform the quantized data {u
(n)
k } so that under the same detection performance constraint,
the LFC will reach the decision faster than the EFC since the former is aware of the transformation but
the latter is not.
6B. Stochastic Encryption and the SPRT at the LFC
The idea is to stochastically encrypt the quantized data {u
(n)
k } at each sensor before they are transmitted
to the LFC. To be specific, at each sensor, an encrypted version u˜
(n)
k of the quantized data u
(n)
k is reported
to the LFC which follows the encryption rule

P
(
u˜
(n)
k = 1
∣∣∣u(n)k = 0) = ψ0,
P
(
u˜
(n)
k = 0
∣∣∣u(n)k = 1) = ψ1, (6)
where ψ0, ψ1 ∈ [0, 1]. Hence the quantized data u
(n)
k is flipped with probability ψi if u
(n)
k = i for
i ∈ {0, 1}. Let p˜ and q˜ denote the probabilities of the event {u˜
(n)
k = 1} under the hypotheses H1 and
H0, respectively. Then we can obtain
p˜ = (1− ψ0 − ψ1) p+ ψ0, (7)
and q˜ = (1− ψ0 − ψ1) q + ψ0. (8)
We assume that the LFC is aware of the encryption parameters ψ0 and ψ1, while the EFC does not
know the existence of the stochastic encryptions. It is worth mentioning that in order to guarantee this
assumption to hold, the encryption parameters ψ0 and ψ1 should be appropriately chosen so that it is
hard for the EFC to perceive the existence of the stochastic encryption. More details about the constraints
on the encryption parameters ψ0 and ψ1 will be discussed later.
Under Assumption 1, every encrypted bit received at the LFC is independent and follows the same
distribution. Hence, for notational simplicity, we use u˜t to denote the t-th encrypted bit received at
the LFC henceforth. In general, the sequential detection procedure employed by the LFC consists of a
stopping rule TL and a decision function DL. The stopping rule TL specifies when the sequential test stops
for decision, and upon stopping at TL, the decision function DL chooses between the two hypotheses.
The optimal sequential detector (TL, DL) minimizes the expected number of sensor data required to reach
a decision with probabilities of false alarm and miss upper bounded by α∗L and β
∗
L, respectively. It is
well known that Wald’s sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) achieves this optimality [14]. Thus, we
assume that the LFC employs the SPRT with the test statistic
L˜t
∆
=
t∑
s=1
l˜s, (9)
where l˜s denotes the LLR of the s-th received encrypted bit, i.e.,
l˜s = 1{u˜s=1} ln
p˜
q˜
+ 1{u˜s=0} ln
1− p˜
1− q˜
. (10)
7The stopping rule and the decision function are given respectively by
TL , inf
{
t
∣∣∣L˜t /∈ (−AL, BL)} , (11)
and DL
∆
=

 1, if L˜TL ≥ BL,0, if L˜TL ≤ −AL, (12)
where the thresholds AL and BL are chosen such that P˜0 (DL = 1) = α
∗
L and P˜1 (DL = 0) = β
∗
L. The
SPRT given by (11)–(12) is optimal in the sense of minimizing both E˜0 {TL} and E˜1 {TL}, where P˜i
and E˜i{} denote the probability measure and the expectation operator under Hi, respectively.
From (10), the LLR is bounded from above as per |l˜s| ≤ max
{∣∣∣ln p˜q˜ ∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣ln 1−p˜1−q˜ ∣∣∣}, which yields the
following result.
Proposition 1. As α∗L and β
∗
L tend to 0 in such a way that α
∗
L+β
∗
L < 1, α
∗
L ln β
∗
L → 0 and β
∗
L lnα
∗
L → 0,
the asymptotic performance of the SPRT employed at the LFC is characterized as
E˜0{TL} =
α∗L ln
α∗L
1−β∗L
+ (1− α∗L) ln
1−α∗L
β∗L
q˜ ln q˜p˜ + (1− q˜) ln
1−q˜
1−p˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
M (0)L
+O(1), (13)
and E˜1{TL} =
β∗L ln
β∗L
1−α∗L
+ (1− β∗L) ln
1−β∗L
α∗L
p˜ ln p˜q˜ + (1− p˜) ln
1−p˜
1−q˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
(1)
L
+O(1). (14)
The proof of Proposition 1 is omitted here, since it is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1.4 in [26].
It is worth mentioning that as α∗L and β
∗
L go to 0, M
(0)
L and M
(1)
L in (13) and (14) respectively increase
to infinity and dominate the O(1) terms, and therefore, determine the behavior of E˜0{TL} and E˜1{TL},
respectively.
III. MISMATCHED SPRT AT THE EFC
The EFC also implements the SPRT but based on a mismatched model, since it is unaware of the
existence of the stochastic encryption. We refer to such sequential detection procedure as the mismatched
SPRT (MSPRT).
In this section, we first show that symmetric stochastic encryptions are ineffective, since the expected
sample sizes at the LFC and EFC are identical when the detection error probabilities are the same at the
LFC and EFC. Then, we obtain the explicit asymptotic characterization of the expected sample size of
the MSPRT.
8A. Mismatched SPRT and Ineffective Stochastic Encryptions
From (4), the mismatched log-likelihood ratio of the s-th encrypted bit u˜s, which is based on the
unencrypted data model, can be written as
ls = 1{u˜s=1} ln
p
q
+ 1{u˜s=0} ln
1− p
1− q
. (15)
Then, under Assumption 1, the test statistic of the MSPRT employed at the EFC is given by
Lt =
t∑
s=1
ls =
t∑
s=1
η
(
1{u˜s=1} − 1{u˜s=0}
)
, (16)
where η , ln p1−p .
Hence, for a given pair of thresholds (AE, BE), the stopping rule TE and the decision function DE
employed at the EFC are given respectively by
TE , inf {t |Lt /∈ (−AE, BE)}
= inf
{
t
∣∣∣∣∣
t∑
s=1
(
1{u˜s=1} − 1{u˜s=0}
)
/∈
(
−
AE
η
,
BE
η
)}
, (17)
and DE
∆
=

 1, if LTE ≥ BE,0, if LTE ≤ −AE. (18)
Since the test statistic in (16) is a multiple of η, AE and BE can be chosen to be multiples of η so that
no overshoot effect occurs. The false alarm and the miss probabilities of the MSPRT can be written as
αE = P˜0(DE = 1) and βE = P˜1(DE = 0), respectively.
Naturally, under the same error probability constraints, the LFC attempts to use less sensor data to reach
a decision than the EFC by employing the stochastic encryption. However, not all stochastic encryptions
can achieve this goal. We first provide a theorem regarding a class of ineffective stochastic encryptions.
Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, if a symmetric stochastic encryption is employed, i.e., ψ0 = ψ1, then
TL = TE as long as the detection error probabilities of the LFC and EFC are the same.
Proof: If ψ0 = ψ1, by (7) and (8), we have
p˜+ q˜ = (1− ψ0 − ψ1)(p + q) + 2ψ0 = 1. (19)
As a result, the test statistic of the SPRT at the LFC in (9) can be rewritten as
L˜t =
t∑
s=1
η˜
(
1{u˜s=1} − 1{u˜s=0}
)
, (20)
9where η˜ , ln p˜1−p˜ . By comparing (16) with (20), we can obtain
L˜t =
η˜
η
Lt. (21)
Noting that AE and BE are chosen to be multiples of η, no overshoot effect occurs in MSPRT. Hence,
we can obtain
αE = P˜0 (DE = 1) = E˜0
{
1{LTE=BE}
}
= E˜1
{
e−L˜TE1{LTE=BE}
}
= e−
η˜
η
BE (1− βE) , (22)
which implies
BE =
η
η˜
ln
1− βE
αE
. (23)
On the other hand, from (11) and (20), the stopping rule TL can be simplified to
TL = inf
{
t
∣∣∣∣∣
t∑
s=1
(
1{u˜s=1} − 1{u˜s=0}
)
/∈
(
−
AL
η˜
,
BL
η˜
)}
, (24)
and hence, AL and BL can be chosen to be multiples of η˜ so that no overshoot effect occurs. From the
definition of the false alarm probability, we can obtain
αL = P˜0 (DL = 1) = E˜0
{
1{L˜TL=BL}
}
= E˜1
{
e−L˜TL1{L˜TL=BL}
}
= e−BL (1− βL) , (25)
which yields
BL = ln
1− βL
αL
. (26)
It is seen from (23) and (26) that if αL = αE and βL = βE, then
BE
η
=
BL
η˜
. (27)
Similarly, by employing the definition of the miss probability, we can obtain
AE
η
=
AL
η˜
. (28)
As a result, by comparing (17) with (24), we know that if αL = αE and βL = βE, then
TL = TE (29)
which concludes the proof.
10
B. Expected Sample Size and Detection Performance of the Mismatched SPRT
In this subsection, we analyze the expected sample size and the detection performance of the MSPRT
for a given pair of thresholds (AE, BE).
In order to obtain E˜i{TE} for i = 0, 1, we will make use of a sequence of stopping times {T
(m)}m∈Z
which are defined as
T
(m) , inf
{
t
∣∣∣∣∣m+
t∑
s=1
(
1{u˜s=1}−1{u˜s=0}
)
/∈
(
−
AE
η
,
BE
η
)}
. (30)
It is clear that
T
(m) = 0, if m ≤ −
AE
η
or m ≥
BE
η
. (31)
According to the definition of T(m) in (30) and the distribution of u˜s, we can obtain that for any
m ∈ (−AE/η,BE/η),
E˜0
{
T
(m)
}
= q˜E˜0
{
T
(m+1)
}
+ (1− q˜)E˜0
{
T
(m−1)
}
+ 1. (32)
Furthermore, the boundary condition in (31) implies
E˜0
{
T
(−AE/η)
}
= E˜0
{
T
(BE/η)
}
= 0. (33)
Solving the recursion given by (32)–(33), we can obtain that if q˜ 6= 12 , then
E˜0
{
T
(m)
}
=
[
1−
(
1−q˜
q˜
)m+AE
η
]
AE+BE
η
(2q˜ − 1)
[
1−
(
1−q˜
q˜
)AE
η
+
BE
η
] − m+ AEη
(2q˜ − 1)
, (34)
and if q˜ = 12 , then
E˜0
{
T
(m)
}
=
(
m+
AE
η
)(
BE
η
−m
)
. (35)
By comparing (17) and (30), we can obtain that T(0) = TE, and hence, if q˜ 6=
1
2 ,
E˜0 {TE} =
[
1−
(
1−q˜
q˜
)AE
η
]
AE+BE
η
(2q˜ − 1)
[
1−
(
1−q˜
q˜
)AE
η
+
BE
η
] − AEη
(2q˜ − 1)
, (36)
and if q˜ = 12 ,
E˜0 {TE} =
AEBE
η2
. (37)
By employing a similar approach, we obtain that if q˜ 6= 12 ,
E˜1 {TE} =
[
1−
(
1−p˜
p˜
)AE
η
]
AE+BE
η
(2p˜ − 1)
[
1−
(
1−p˜
p˜
)AE
η
+
BE
η
] − AEη
(2p˜− 1)
, (38)
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and if q˜ = 12 ,
E˜1 {TE} =
AEBE
η2
. (39)
Next, we consider the detection performance of the MSPRT. Let αE and βE denote the false alarm and
miss probabilities of the MSPRT at the EFC, respectively, that is,
αE , P˜0 (LTE ≥ BE) = P˜0
(
TE∑
s=1
(
1{u˜s=1} − 1{u˜s=0}
)
≥
BE
η
)
, (40)
and βE , P˜1 (LTE ≤ AE) = P˜1
(
TE∑
s=1
(
1{u˜s=1} − 1{u˜s=0}
)
≤ −
AE
η
)
. (41)
Based on the sequence of stopping times {T(m)}m∈Z, we also define a sequence of probabilities {α
(m)}m∈Z
as
α(m) , P˜0

m+ T(m)∑
s=1
(
1{u˜s=1}−1{u˜s=0}
)
≥
BE
η

 , (42)
which yields that ∀m ∈ (−AE/η,BE/η)
α(m) = q˜α(m+1) + (1− q˜)α(m−1) (43)
by employing the distribution of u˜s. What is more, the boundary condition in (31) implies
α(−AE/η) = 0 and α(BE/η) = 1. (44)
Solving the recursion in (43)–(44), we can obtain
α(m) =


1−
(
1−q˜
q˜
)m+AE
η
1−
(
1−q˜
q˜
)AE+BE
η
, if q˜ 6=
1
2
,
η
AE +BE
(
m+
AE
η
)
, if q˜ =
1
2
.
(45)
From (40) and (42), we know αE = α
(0), and therefore, αE can be obtained from (45) as
αE =


1−
(
1−q˜
q˜
)AE
η
1−
(
1−q˜
q˜
)AE+BE
η
, if q˜ 6=
1
2
,
AE
AE +BE
, if q˜ =
1
2
.
(46)
Similarly, the miss probability of the MSPRT can be derived as
βE =


−
(
1−p˜
p˜
)AE+BE
η
+
(
1−p˜
p˜
)AE
η
1−
(
1−p˜
p˜
)AE+BE
η
, if p˜ 6=
1
2
,
BE
AE +BE
, if p˜ =
1
2
.
(47)
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C. Asymptotic Characterization of the Mismatched SPRT
It is seen from (36)–(39), (46) and (47) that E˜i{TE}, αE and βE can all be exactly expressed in terms
of the thresholds AE and BE. Note that (46) and (47) are transcendental equations, and therefore, do
not admit closed-form expressions of AE and BE in terms of αE and βE. Thus, it is generally difficult
to express E˜i{TE} in terms of αE and βE. In this subsection, we focus on the asymptotic regime where
αE and βE tend to zero, and derive the asymptotic expressions of E˜i{TE} in terms of αE and βE.
Before proceeding, some consideration on the encryption parameters ψ0 and ψ1 is discussed from the
perspective of the EFC.
It is seen from (46) and (47) that by employing different encryption parameters ψ0 and ψ1 which
bring about different p˜ and q˜, the false alarm and miss probabilities at the EFC can be very different. In
particular, if q˜ = 1/2, then as AE and BE tend to infinity with AE = BE,
αE =
1
2
> 0. (48)
In addition, if q˜ > 1/2, then by employing (46), we can obtain that
αE ≥ 1−
(
1− q˜
q˜
)
> 0, for any AE and BE. (49)
Noticing from (48) and (49) that if q˜ ≥ 1/2, then the false alarm probability αE at the EFC cannot be
driven to 0 as AE and BE increase to infinity with AE = BE. On the other hand, it is well known that
for the SPRT, the error probabilities decrease to 0 as the thresholds increase to infinity [26]. Thus, if
the encryption parameters are chosen such that q˜ ≥ 1/2, then the MSPRT at the EFC does not obey
the elementary property of the SPRT that error probabilities decrease to 0 as the thresholds increase to
infinity. In practice, it is possible for the EFC to perceive the encryption, since the EFC can choose
sufficiently large AE and BE with AE = BE but still observes false alarms.
On the other hand, if ψ0 and ψ1 are chosen such that q˜ < 1/2, then according to (46), the false alarm
probability αE at the EFC can alway be reduced to 0 by increasing AE and BE to infinity, which agrees
with the property of the SPRT. Hence it is harder for the EFC to perceive the existence of stochastic
encryption. To this end, the system designer should choose the encryption parameters ψ0 and ψ1 to ensure
q˜ < 1/2 to hinder the EFC from perceiving the existence of stochastic encryption, so that even if the
EFC notices that the transmissions from the sensors are stopped before it makes its decision, the EFC
would only think this is because it sets the upper bounds on the error probabilities smaller than that at
the LFC, since the EFC is unaware of α∗L and β
∗
L at the LFC.
Similarly, by analyzing the property of βE in (47), we conclude that the encryption parameters ψ0 and
ψ1 should ensure p˜ > 1/2. Therefore, we make the following assumption.
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Assumption 2. In order to hinder the EFC from perceiving the existence of the stochastic encryption,
the encryption parameters ψ0 and ψ1 are chosen such that
p˜ = (1− ψ0 − ψ1) p+ ψ0 >
1
2
, (50)
and q˜ = (1− ψ0 − ψ1) q + ψ0 <
1
2
. (51)
The following theorem characterizes the asymptotic performance of the MSPRT at the EFC when αE
and βE tend to zero.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the following results hold.
1) As αE, βE → 0, the thresholds AE, BE →∞.
2) The expected sample sizes E˜i(TE) at the EFC under H0 and H1 can be respectively written in
terms of αE and βE as
E˜0 {TE} =
1
1− 2q˜
[
(1− αE) logµ
1
βE
− αE logν
1
αE
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
M (0)E
+o(1), (52)
E˜1 {TE} =
1
2p˜− 1
[
(1− βE) logν
1
αE
− βE logµ
1
βE
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
(1)
E
+o(1), (53)
with µ ,
p˜
1− p˜
> 1 and ν ,
1− q˜
q˜
> 1. (54)
3) For any given ψ0 and ψ1, we have
∂M
(0)
E
∂βE
< 0 and
∂M
(1)
E
∂αE
< 0, (55)
∂M
(0)
E
∂αE
< 0 if αE <
1
e
, (56)
∂M
(1)
E
∂βE
< 0 if βE <
1
e
. (57)
Proof: We first prove 1). Under Assumptions 1 and 2, by employing (46), (47) and (54), the
expressions of αE and βE can be simplified to
αE =
ν
AE
η − 1
ν
AE+BE
η − 1
=
1− ν−
AE
η
ν
BE
η − ν−
AE
η
, (58)
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and βE =
µ
BE
η − 1
µ
AE+BE
η − 1
=
1− µ−
BE
η
µ
AE
η − µ−
BE
η
. (59)
Since AE/η ≥ 1 and BE/η ≥ 1, αE and βE can be bounded from below as per
αE >
1− ν−1
ν
BE
η
and βE >
1− µ−1
µ
AE
η
, (60)
which implies that as αE → 0, BE →∞, and similarly, AE →∞ as βE → 0.
Next, we prove 2). From (58), we can obtain
αEν
BE
η − 1 = −(1− αE)ν
−
AE
η . (61)
Note that AE →∞, as βE → 0, and hence from (61), we know
αEν
BE
η − 1 = o(1), as βE → 0, (62)
which implies
BE
η
= logν
1
αE
+ o(1), as βE → 0. (63)
Similarly, (59) yields that
AE
η
= logµ
1
βE
+ o(1), as αE → 0. (64)
By employing (36), (54), (58), (63) and (64), we can obtain that as αE, βE → 0
E˜0{TE} =
1
1− 2q˜
[
(1− αE)
AE
η
− αE
BE
η
]
=
1
1− 2q˜
[
(1− αE) logµ
1
βE
− αE logν
1
αE
]
+ o(1).
Similarly, we can show that as αE, βE → 0,
E˜1 {TE} =
1
2p˜− 1
[
(1− βE) logν
1
αE
− βE logµ
1
βE
]
+ o(1).
At last, we prove 3). By employing the definition of M
(0)
E in (52), we can obtain
∂M
(0)
E
∂αE
=
1
1− 2q˜
1
ln ν
(
1− logµ ν ln
1
βE
− ln
1
αE
)
. (65)
Under Assumption 2, we know that q˜ < 12 , and moreover, from (54), we know ν > 1. Hence,
∂M
(0)
E
∂αE
< 0
if and only if
1− logµ ν ln
1
βE
− ln
1
αE
< 0, (66)
which is equivalent to
αE <
1
e
(
1
βE
)logµ ν
. (67)
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Noting that βE ∈ [0, 1] and µ, ν > 1, we know that if αE <
1
e , then (67) is satisfied, and hence,
∂M
(0)
E
∂αE
< 0.
On the other hand, from the definition of M
(0)
E in (52), we can obtain
∂M
(0)
E
∂βE
= −
1
(1− 2q˜) lnµ
1− αE
βE
< 0. (68)
Similarly, it can be shown that for any given ψ0 and ψ1,
∂M
(1)
E
∂βE
< 0 if βE <
1
e and
∂M
(1)
E
∂αE
< 0.
It is seen from the definitions in (52) and (53) that M
(0)
E , M
(1)
E → ∞ as αE, βE → 0, and hence,
dominate the o(1) terms and determine the behavior of E˜0{TE} and E˜1{TE}, respectively.
By comparing M
(i)
E in (52) and (53) with M
(i)
L in (13) and (14), it is clear that the dominant term
M
(i)
E in E˜i{TE} couples with the encryption parameters ψ0 and ψ1 in a more complicated way when
compared to the dominant termM
(i)
L in E˜i{TL}. In particular,M
(i)
L is determined by the KL divergences
between the distributions under H0 and H1, while M
(i)
L is unrelated to the KL divergences.
Note that from Theorem 2, if αE <
1
e and βE <
1
e , then M
(i)
E monotonically decreases as αE or βE
increases. On the other hand, by employing the definitions of M
(0)
L and M
(1)
L in (13) and (14), after
some algebra, we can obtain that if α∗L + β
∗
L < 1, then
∂M
(0)
L
∂α∗L
∝
∂M
(1)
L
∂β∗L
∝ − ln
(
1 +
1− α∗L − β
∗
L
α∗Lβ
∗
L
)
< 0, (69)
∂M
(0)
L
∂β∗L
∝
∂M
(1)
L
∂α∗L
∝ − (1− α∗L − β
∗
L) < 0. (70)
which implies that for each i, M
(i)
L also monotonically decreases as α
∗
L or β
∗
L increases.
To compare the asymptotic performance of the SPRT with that of the MSPRT numerically, Fig. 1
depicts the values of ML , pi0M
(0)
L + pi1M
(1)
L and ME , pi0M
(0)
E + pi1M
(1)
E under different stochastic
encryptions when α∗L = β
∗
L = αE = βE grow from 10
−10 to 10−3. We set p = 0.7, q = 0.3, and
the priors of H0 and H1 as pi0 = pi1 = 0.5. It is seen from Fig. 1 that ML and ME both decrease as
α∗L = β
∗
L = αE = βE increase, and the difference between ML and ME vary considerably for different
stochastic encryption parameters. For example, when ψ0 = ψ1 = 0.05, ML = ME which agrees with
the results in Theorem 1, while there is a big gap between ML and ME when ψ0 = 0 and ψ1 = 0.2.
Furthermore, Fig. 1 illustrates that under different stochastic encryptions, the difference between the slope
ofME and that ofML can be significantly different. These observations motivate us to pursue the optimal
stochastic encryption.
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Fig. 1: ML and ME under different (ψ0, ψ1).
IV. OPTIMAL STOCHASTIC ENCRYPTION
In this section, we consider the optimization of the encryption parameters ψ0 and ψ1 with the goal of
maximizing the difference between the expected sample sizes at the EFC and LFC with probabilities of
false alarm and miss upper bounded by prescribed values. For a fair comparison between the expected
sample sizes at the LFC and EFC, we set the upper bounds on the error probabilities to be identical at
the LFC and EFC, i.e., αL ≤ α
∗, αE ≤ α
∗, βL ≤ β
∗ and βE ≤ β
∗. Moreover, denote Ψ , [ψ0, ψ1].
A. Optimization Formulation
To take into account the increase in the expected sample sizes at the LFC induced by the stochastic
encryption, we impose the following constraints
λi (Ψ) ,
E˜i{TL} −Ei{TL}
Ei{TL}
≤ κi, i = 0, 1, (71)
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where κi is a nonnegative constant which represents the upper bound on the acceptable tolerance of the
increase in the expected sample sizes at the LFC induced by the stochastic encryption. The term Ei{TL}
in (71) corresponds to the case of no stochastic encryption, which can be obtained from (13) and (14)
by replacing p˜ and q˜ by p and q, respectively.
Under Assumption 2, the optimization of the stochastic encryption parameter Ψ can be cast as the
following maximin problem
max
Ψ,αL,βL
min
αE,βE
1∑
i=0
pii
(
E˜i {TE} − E˜i {TL}
)
(72a)
s. t. λi (Ψ) ≤ κi, ∀i = 0, 1, (72b)
(1− ψ0 − ψ1) p+ ψ0 >
1
2
, (72c)
(1− ψ0 − ψ1) q + ψ0 <
1
2
, (72d)
αL ≤ α
∗, βL ≤ β
∗, (72e)
αE ≤ α
∗, βE ≤ β
∗. (72f)
Since the LFC employs the SPRT, it is clear that the constraint in (72e) is active for the optimal
solution, that is,
αL = α
∗ and βL = β
∗. (73)
However, for the MSPRT, the expected sample sizes E˜i{TE} may not be minimized when αE = α
∗ and
βE = β
∗ in general. To this end, as illustrated in the maximin problem in (72), we consider the best
performance of the EFC in terms of the expected sample size when its detection performance satisfies
the constraints, that is, αE ≤ α
∗ and βE ≤ β
∗.
B. Optimization Problem in the Asymptotic Regime
In general, the optimization problem in (72) is not tractable, since the closed-form expression for the
objective function in (72a) does not generally exist. In the following, we consider the objective function
in (72a) in the asymptotic regime where α∗ and β∗ are sufficiently small. From (13), (14), (52) and
(53), by keeping the leading-order terms and ignoring the lower-order terms, E˜i{TL} and E˜i{TE} can
be approximated in the asymptotic regime as
E˜0{TL} ≈
− lnβ∗
q˜ ln q˜p˜ + (1− q˜) ln
1−q˜
1−p˜
, Tˆ
(0)
L (Ψ), (74)
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E˜1{TL} ≈
− lnα∗
p˜ ln p˜q˜ + (1− p˜) ln
1−p˜
1−q˜
, Tˆ
(1)
L (Ψ), (75)
E˜0 {TE} ≈
1
1− 2q˜
logµ
1
βE
, Tˆ
(0)
E (Ψ), (76)
and E˜1 {TE} ≈
1
2p˜ − 1
logν
1
αE
, Tˆ
(1)
E (Ψ). (77)
It is worth mentioning that the asymptotic approximations employed in (74)–(77) are similar to that
suggested by Wald in [13] which is known as Wald’s approximation, and are commonly utilized in
recent literature, see [27], [28] for instance.
It is seen from (76) and (77) that Tˆ
(i)
E (Ψ) is nonincreasing functions of αE and βE, and therefore, the
optimization problem in (72) can be reduced to
max
Ψ
pi0
[
Tˆ
(0)
E (Ψ)− Tˆ
(0)
L (Ψ)
]
+ pi1
[
Tˆ
(1)
E (Ψ)− Tˆ
(1)
L (Ψ)
]
(78a)
s. t. λˆi (Ψ) ≤ κi, ∀i = 0, 1, (78b)
(1− ψ0 − ψ1) p+ ψ0 >
1
2
, (78c)
(1− ψ0 − ψ1) q + ψ0 <
1
2
, (78d)
αL = αE = α
∗, βL = βE = β
∗, (78e)
where
λˆi(Ψ) ,
Tˆ
(i)
L (Ψ)− Tˆ
(i)
L ([0, 0])
Tˆ
(i)
L ([0, 0])
, i = 0, 1, (79)
is the corresponding asymptotic approximation of λi(Ψ) in (71).
By plugging (74)–(77) into (78), we attain an optimization problem where every term has an analytic
expression. However, the optimization problem in (78) is generally nonconvex. In particular, both the
objective function in (78a) and the feasible region specified by (78b)–(78d) are generally nonconvex.
Thus, it is generally intractable to find the globally optimal solution.
C. Optimal Solution under Small κi
In this subsection, we will show that for small κi in (78b), the globally optimal solution to (78) can
be analytically obtained.
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We first look into the constraint in (78b). By employing (74) and (75), λˆi(Ψ) can be rewritten as
λˆ0 (Ψ) =
H(q, p)
H(q˜, p˜)
− 1 and λˆ1 (Ψ) =
H(p, q)
H(p˜, q˜)
− 1, (80)
with H(x, y) , x ln
x
y
+ (1− x) ln
1− x
1− y
> 0, if x 6= y. (81)
The following Lemma provides some insights into the constraint in (78b). The proof is given in
Appendix A.
Lemma 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, we have the following results.
1) For any given Ψ,
∇Ψλˆi (Ψ) ≻ 0, i = 0, 1. (82)
2) There exist two constants ζλˆ and cλˆ such that if
κ , max{κ0, κ1} < ζλˆ (83)
then
ψ
(λˆ)
j , sup
{
ψj |∃ψ1−j , s.t. λˆi (Ψ) ≤ κi, i = 0, 1
}
(84)
= sup
{
ψj |λˆi (Ψ) ≤ κi with ψ1−j = 0, i = 0, 1
}
(85)
= min
{
ψj,λˆ0 , ψj,λˆ1
}
(86)
< cλˆκ, (87)
where ψj,λˆi is the solution to λˆi (Ψ) = κi given ψ1−j = 0.
The constants ζλˆ and cλˆ in Lemma 1 are defined in (122). Using the definition of ψ
(λˆ)
j in (84), denote
the following two points in the ψ0-ψ1 plane,
Ψ
(λˆ)
0 ,
[
ψ
(λˆ)
0 , 0
]
and Ψ
(λˆ)
1 ,
[
0, ψ
(λˆ)
1
]
. (88)
Noticing from (79), it is clear that λˆi([0, 0]) = 0, i = 0, 1. Moreover, as demonstrated by 1) in Lemma
1, ∇Ψλˆi (Ψ) ≻ 0 which implies that if Ψ 6= 0, then λˆi(Ψ) > 0, i = 0, 1, and hence, Tˆ
(i)
L (Ψ) >
Tˆ
(i)
L ([0, 0]), i = 0, 1. Therefore, every stochastic encryption degrades the performance of the SPRT at
the LFC by increasing the expected sample size. Furthermore, as 2) in Lemma 1 illustrates, the points
Ψ
(λˆ)
0 and Ψ
(λˆ)
1 respectively attain the largest possible values of ψ0 and ψ1 in the set specified by
∩1i=0{Ψ|λˆi(Ψ) ≤ κi}. Moreover, these two largest values ψ
(λˆ)
0 and ψ
(λˆ)
1 are bounded from above and
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can be controlled by κ. It is worth mentioning that the set specified by λˆi (Ψ) ≤ κi is just the region
enclosed by [0, ψ
(λˆ)
0 ]× {0}, {0} × [0, ψ
(λˆ)
1 ] and the contour of λˆi (Ψ) = κi.
Next we consider the constraints (78c) and (78d). Let [0, ψ
(p˜)
1 ] and [ψ
(q˜)
0 , 0] respectively denote the
point where the line (1− ψ0 − ψ1) p + ψ0 = 1/2 intersects the ψ1-axis and the point where the line
(1− ψ0 − ψ1) q + ψ0 = 1/2 intersects the ψ0-axis. It can be shown that
ψ
(p˜)
1 = 1−
1
2p
and ψ
(q˜)
0 =
1− 2q
2(1 − q)
. (89)
According to the constraints in (78c) and (78d), we know that in the ψ0-ψ1 plane, the closed interval
{0}× [0, ψ
(p˜)
1 ] and the closed interval [0, ψ
(q˜)
0 ]×{0} are both contained in the set specified by (78c) and
(78d). Therefore, if
κ < ζp˜,q˜ , min
{
ψ
(q˜)
0
cλˆ
,
ψ
(p˜)
1
cλˆ
}
, (90)
then ψ
(λˆ)
0 < ψ
(q˜)
0 and ψ
(λˆ)
1 < ψ
(q˜)
1 , and hence
1
sup {ψj |∃ψ1−j, s.t. Ψ = [ψ1−j , ψj ] ∈ E } = ψ
(λˆ)
j , (91)
where E denotes the feasible set specified by all the constraints in the optimization problem in (78). From
(91), we know that
E ⊆ E¯ ,
{
Ψ : ψ0 ∈ [0, ψ
(λˆ)
0 ], ψ1 ∈ [0, ψ
(λˆ)
1 ]
}
. (92)
With regard to the behavior of the objective function in (78a), we have the following lemma. The
proof is given in Appendix B.
Lemma 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, we have the following results.
1) Tˆ
(i)
E (Ψ) − Tˆ
(i)
L (Ψ) ≥ 0, i = 0, 1, with equality if and only if a symmetric encryption is employed,
i.e., ψ0 = ψ1.
2) There exists a constant ζobj such that if
κ < ζobj, (93)
then in the region E¯ ∩ {Ψ : ψ1 > ψ0 ≥ 0}, we have that
∂
[
Tˆ
(i)
E (Ψ)− Tˆ
(i)
L (Ψ)
]
∂ψ0
< 0 and
∂
[
Tˆ
(i)
E (Ψ)− Tˆ
(i)
L (Ψ)
]
∂ψ1
> 0, i = 0, 1, (94)
1If j = 0, then the vector [ψ1−j , ψj ] in (91) needs to be replaced by [ψj , ψ1−j ].
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while in the region E¯ ∩ {Ψ : 0 ≤ ψ1 < ψ0}, we have that
∂
[
Tˆ
(i)
E (Ψ)− Tˆ
(i)
L (Ψ)
]
∂ψ0
> 0 and
∂
[
Tˆ
(i)
E (Ψ)− Tˆ
(i)
L (Ψ)
]
∂ψ1
< 0, i = 0, 1. (95)
As illustrated by 1) in Lemma 2, the expected sample size at the EFC is no fewer than that at the
LFC in the asymptotic regime where α∗, β∗ → 0. From Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, we have the following
corollary regarding the symmetric stochastic encryptions.
Corollary 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the symmetric stochastic encryptions are the least favorable
in the asymptotic regime where α∗, β∗ → 0, since they are the only class of stochastic encryptions which
cannot help the LFC outperform the EFC in terms of the expected sample sizes.
Finally, in the following theorem, for small κ, we give the optimal stochastic encryption in the sense
of maximizing the difference between the expected sample sizes at the EFC and LFC.
Theorem 3. If the following conditions
(C1) ψ
(λˆ)
0 ≤
1−2q
2(1−q) and ψ
(λˆ)
1 ≤ 1−
1
2p
(C2) for i = 0, 1,
∂[Tˆ(i)E (Ψ)−Tˆ
(i)
L (Ψ)]
∂ψ0
< 0 and
∂[Tˆ(i)E (Ψ)−Tˆ
(i)
L (Ψ)]
∂ψ1
> 0 in the region E ∩ {Ψ : ψ1 > ψ0 ≥ 0}
∂[Tˆ(i)E (Ψ)−Tˆ
(i)
L (Ψ)]
∂ψ0
> 0 and
∂[Tˆ(i)E (Ψ)−Tˆ
(i)
L (Ψ)]
∂ψ1
< 0 in the region E ∩ {Ψ : ψ0 > ψ1 ≥ 0}
hold, then
Ψ
∗ = argmax
Ψ∈
{
Ψ
(λˆ)
0 ,Ψ
(λˆ)
1
}
1∑
i=0
pii
[
Tˆ
(i)
E (Ψ) − Tˆ
(i)
L (Ψ)
]
, (96)
where Ψ
(λˆ)
0 and Ψ
(λˆ)
1 are defined in (88).
Moreover, under Assumptions 1 and 2, the conditions in (C1) and (C2) hold provided that
κ < ζ∗ , min
{
ζλˆ, ζp˜,q˜, ζobj
}
, (97)
where ζλˆ and ζobj are respectively defined in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, and ζp˜,q˜ is defined in (90).
Proof: For the sake of notational simplicity, denote gi(ψ0, ψ1) , Tˆ
(i)
E (Ψ)−Tˆ
(i)
L (Ψ) and g(ψ0, ψ1) ,∑1
i=0 pii[Tˆ
(i)
E (Ψ)− Tˆ
(i)
L (Ψ)].
If condition (C1) hold, then from (91), we have
ψ
(λˆ)
0 = sup {ψ0 |∃ψ1, s.t. Ψ = [ψ0, ψ1] ∈ E } , (98)
and ψ
(λˆ)
1 = sup {ψ1 |∃ψ0, s.t. Ψ = [ψ0, ψ1] ∈ E } . (99)
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Hence, according to (C2), for any point Ψ = [ψ0, ψ1] in the region E ∩ {Ψ : ψ1 > ψ0 ≥ 0},
gi
(
0, ψ
(λˆ)
1
)
≥ gi(0, ψ1) ≥ gi(ψ0, ψ1), (100)
while in the region E ∩ {Ψ : ψ0 > ψ1 ≥ 0},
gi
(
ψ
(λˆ)
0 , 0
)
≥ gi(ψ1, 0) ≥ gi(ψ0, ψ1). (101)
Therefore, in the region E ∩ {Ψ : ψ1 > ψ0 ≥ 0}, we have
g
(
0, ψ
(λˆ)
1
)
=
1∑
i=0
piigi
(
0, ψ
(λˆ)
1
)
= max
Ψ:ψ1>ψ0
1∑
i=0
pii
[
Tˆ
(i)
E (Ψ)− Tˆ
(i)
L (Ψ)
]
> 0, (102)
where the inequality in (102) is due to 1) in Lemma 2. Similarly, in the region E ∩ {Ψ : ψ0 > ψ1 ≥ 0},
we have
g
(
ψ
(λˆ)
0 , 0
)
=
1∑
i=0
piigi
(
ψ
(λˆ)
0 , 0
)
= max
Ψ:ψ1<ψ0
1∑
i=0
pii
[
Tˆ
(i)
E (Ψ)− Tˆ
(i)
L (Ψ)
]
> 0, (103)
where the inequality in (103) is also from 1) in Lemma 2. We conclude the proof for (96) by noting
the fact that if ψ1 = ψ0, then
∑1
i=0 pii[Tˆ
(i)
E (Ψ) − Tˆ
(i)
L (Ψ)] = 0 which is smaller than g(ψ
(λˆ)
0 , 0) and
g(0, ψ
(λˆ)
1 ) from (102) and (103).
Furthermore, by employing (92), Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we know that if κ < ζ∗ , min
{
ζλˆ, ζp˜,q˜, ζobj
}
,
then the conditions (C1) and (C2) hold.
As illustrated in Theorem 3, there exists a constant ζ∗ such that if κ < ζ∗ then the optimal solution of
the optimization problem in (78) can only be either the pointΨ
(λˆ)
0 orΨ
(λˆ)
1 . Thus, the optimization problem
in (78) can be easily solved, though it is a nonconvex optimization problem. We summarize this procedure
in Algorithm 1. The expression of λˆi(Ψ) can be found in (80). The expressions of
∂[Tˆ(0)E (Ψ)−Tˆ
(0)
L (Ψ)]
∂ψ0
and
∂[Tˆ(0)E (Ψ)−Tˆ
(0)
L (Ψ)]
∂ψ1
can be found in (154) and (155), respectively. The closed-form expressions of
the other partial derivatives in condition (C2) can be similarly obtained by following the steps for
obtaining (154) and (155) in Appendix B. Thus, condition (C2) can be numerically evaluated. From
(79), we can obtain λˆi([0, 0]) = 0, i = 0, 1. Moreover, by 1) in Lemma 1, we know that λˆi([ψ0, 0])
and λˆi([0, ψ1]) are strictly increasing with respect to ψ0 and ψ1, respectively. Hence, if κi satisfies
0 ≤ κi ≤ min{λˆi([0, 1]), λˆi([1, 0])}, then by the Intermediate Value Theorem, we know that the solution
ψ
(λˆ)
j in Step 3 in Algorithm 1 exists and is unique. In addition, by the monotonicity of λˆi([ψ0, 0]) and
23
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2
ψ0
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
ψ
1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
Fig. 2: The contour of λˆ0(Ψ).
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Fig. 3: The contour of λˆ1(Ψ).
λˆi([0, ψ1]), ψj,λˆi can be easily obtained by numerically searching the point along ψj-axis which achieves
λˆi(Ψ) = κi for i, j = 0, 1. It is worth mentioning that as demonstrated by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2,
the conditions (C1) and (C2) can always be ensured provided that κ0 and κ1 are small enough. Note
from (88), the optimal stochastic encryption strategy is just to flip one type of quantized bit with larger
probability and keep the other type of quantized bit unchanged.
Algorithm 1 Procedure for computing the optimal Ψ∗ under small κi
1: Input: p, q, and κi;
2: Output: Ψ∗
3: Evaluate ψ
(λˆ)
j :
[ψ0,λˆi , 0]← {Ψ : λˆi(Ψ) = κi} ∩ {ψ0–axis}
[0, ψ1,λˆi ]← {Ψ : λˆi(Ψ) = κi} ∩ {ψ1–axis}
ψ
(λˆ)
j ← min{ψj,λˆ0 , ψj,λˆ1}, j = 0, 1
4: if the conditions (C1) and (C2) hold then
5: Ψ∗ ← argmax
Ψ∈
{
Ψ
(λˆ)
0 =[ψ
(λˆ)
0 ,0],Ψ
(λˆ)
1 =[0,ψ
(λˆ)
1 ]
}
1∑
i=0
pii
[
Tˆ
(i)
E (Ψ) − Tˆ
(i)
L (Ψ)
]
6: end if
It is worth mentioning that the constant ζ∗ in (97) does not depend on α∗, β∗ and the stochastic
encryption parameter Ψ. Moreover, Ψ
(λˆ)
0 and Ψ
(λˆ)
1 do not depend on α
∗, β∗, pi0, and pi1. The optimal
solution Ψ∗ depends on α∗, β∗, pi0, and pi1 only through the binary selection in (96). Here, we present
an example to illustrate the results in Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Theorem 3.
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Fig. 4: TˆE(Ψ) − TˆL(Ψ) versus ψ0 and ψ1.
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Fig. 5: The contour of TˆE(Ψ)− TˆL(Ψ).
Consider the signal model in (5) where θ = 1 and the independent noise w
(n)
k ∼ N (0, 1). The quantizers
employed at the sensors are Qn(x) = 1{x≥ θ
2
} for all n. In addition, the priors are pi0 = pi1 = 0.5 and the
prescribed error probability bounds are α∗ = β∗ = 10−6. Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 depict the contours of λˆ0(Ψ)
and λˆ1(Ψ), respectively. It is seen that the feasible set specified by (78b)–(78d) in this case is nonconvex.
Moreover, it is clear that ∇Ψλˆi(Ψ) ≻ 0 for i = 0, 1 which corroborates the results in Lemma 1. Fig. 4
illustrates the objective function TˆE(Ψ)− TˆL(Ψ) , pi0[Tˆ
(0)
E (Ψ)− Tˆ
(0)
L (Ψ)] + pi1[Tˆ
(1)
E (Ψ)− Tˆ
(1)
L (Ψ)] in
(78a) versus the encryption parameters ψ0 and ψ1, and the contours of the objective function TˆE(Ψ)−
TˆL(Ψ) is depicted in Fig. 5. As expected from Theorem 3, the numerical results in Fig. 4 verify that
the maximum value of TˆE(Ψ)− TˆL(Ψ) can only be attained at either the upper left corner or the lower
right corner. Furthermore, it is seen that the contour curves in Fig. 5 agree with the results in Lemma 2.
D. Simulation Results
In this subsection, we present a few simulation results to illustrate the performance of the optimal
stochastic encryption.
The simulation setup considered in this subsection is the same as that for Fig. 2–Fig. 5. It is seen
from Fig. 2–Fig. 5 that if 0 ≤ ψ0 ≤ 0.2 and 0 ≤ ψ1 ≤ 0.2, the conditions (C1) and (C2) hold.
Assume that κ0 = 0.265 and κ1 = 0.2077. By employing Step 3 in Algorithm 1, we can obtain Ψ
(λˆ)
0 =
[0.08, 0] and Ψ
(λˆ)
1 = [0, 0.1]. Moreover, if α
∗ = β∗, then by employing (74)–(77), we can obtain∑1
i=0 pii[Tˆ
(i)
E ([0, 0.1])− Tˆ
(i)
L ([0, 0.1])] = 1.756
∑1
i=0 pii[Tˆ
(i)
E ([0.08, 0])− Tˆ
(i)
L ([0.08, 0])]. Hence, according
to Theorem 3, Ψ∗ = Ψ
(λˆ)
1 = [0, 0.1] is the optimal solution of (78) provided α
∗ = β∗. In the following,
we compare the performance under different Ψ, the optimal Ψ = [0, 0.1], some feasible but not optimal
25
10 -10 10 -9 10 -8 10 -7 10 -6 10 -5 10 -4 10 -3
α
*
 = β
*
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 sa
m
pl
e 
siz
e
LFC with Ψ=[0,0]
EFC with Ψ=[0,0]
LFC with Ψ=[0.05,0.05]
EFC with Ψ=[0.05,0.05]
Fig. 6: The expected sample sizes at the LFC and
EFC for Ψ = [0, 0] and Ψ = [0.05, 0.05].
10 -10 10 -9 10 -8 10 -7 10 -6 10 -5 10 -4 10 -3
α
*
 = β
*
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 sa
m
pl
e 
siz
e
LFC with Ψ=[0,0.1]
EFC with Ψ=[0,0.1]
LFC with Ψ=[0,0.05]
EFC with Ψ=[0,0.05]
Fig. 7: The expected sample sizes at the LFC and
EFC for Ψ = [0, 0.1] and Ψ = [0, 0.05].
Ψ = [0, 0.05] and Ψ = [0.05, 0.05], and under no stochastic encryption, i.e., Ψ = [0, 0]. The average
sample sizes over 104 Monte Carlo runs at the LFC and EFC (i.e., E˜{TL} , pi0E˜0{TL} + pi1E˜1{TL}
and E˜{TE} , pi0E˜0{TE} + pi1E˜1{TE}) versus the prescribed error probability bounds (i.e., α
∗ = β∗)
are depicted in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7. As illustrated in Fig. 6, with no stochastic encryption, i.e., Ψ = [0, 0],
then the expected sample sizes at the LFC and EFC are the same which agrees with the intuition. In
addition, when the symmetric stochastic encryption Ψ = [0.05, 0.05] is employed, the simulation results
in Fig. 6 verifies that the expected sample sizes at the LFC and EFC are the same as stated by Theorem
1. Moreover, the symmetric stochastic encryption Ψ = [0.05, 0.05] causes an increase in the expected
sample size at the LFC compared to the case of no stochastic encryption, which verifies that the stochastic
encryption incurs performance degradation at the LFC.
In Fig. 7, the performances of the optimal stochastic encryption Ψ = [0, 0.1] and the non-optimal
stochastic encryption Ψ = [0, 0.05] are compared. It is seen that under the optimal stochastic encryption,
the difference between the expected sample sizes at the EFC and LFC is significantly larger than that
under the non-optimal one. However, this is at the price of an increase in the expected sample size at
the LFC. In addition, the slope of E˜{TE} is smaller than that of E˜{TL}, that is, as α
∗ = β∗ decreases,
E˜{TE} grows faster than E˜{TL}, and therefore, the difference between E˜{TE} and E˜{TL} becomes
larger.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
We have investigated sequential detection based on single-bit quantized data and in the presence of
eavesdroppers. By employing stochastic encryptions at the sensors, each quantized bit is randomly flipped
according to certain probabilities before transmitted to the LFC. The LFC knows both the distribution
of the quantized data and the flipping probabilities and employs the optimal SPRT; whereas the EFC is
unaware of the stochastic encryption and therefore employs a mismatched SPRT. We have characterized
the expected sample size and the error probabilities of the MSPRT in terms of the detection thresholds.
We have shown that when the detection error probabilities are set to be the same at the LFC and EFC,
every symmetric stochastic encryption leads to the same expected size at the LFC and EFC. Furthermore,
we have provided the asymptotic analysis on the expected sample size in terms of the vanishing error
probabilities, and revealed the stark difference from the asymptotic performance of the SPRT with no
model mismatch. In the asymptotic regime of small detection error probabilities, we have shown that
every stochastic encryption degrades the performance of the SPRT at the LFC by increasing the expected
sample size, and the expected sample size required at the EFC is no fewer than that is required at the
LFC. To this end, symmetric stochastic encryptions are the least favorable ones. Then we have considered
the design of the optimal stochastic encryption in the sense of maximizing the difference between the
expected sample sizes required at the EFC and LFC. Although this optimization problem is nonconvex,
we have shown that if the acceptable tolerance of the increase in the expected sample size at the LFC
induced by the stochastic encryption is small enough, the globally optimal stochastic encryption can be
analytically obtained. Moreover, the optimal strategy randomly flips only one type of quantized bits (i.e.,
0 or 1) and keeps the other type unchanged.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We first prove 1). From (80), we know that ∇Ψλˆi (Ψ) ≻ 0, i = 0, 1 is equivalent to
∇ΨH(p˜, q˜) ≺ 0 and ∇ΨH(q˜, p˜) ≺ 0. (104)
By employing (81), after some algebra, we can obtain that ∀j ∈ {0, 1},
∂H(p˜, q˜)
∂ψj
=
∂p˜
∂ψj
ln
p˜ (1− q˜)
q˜ (1− p˜)
−
p˜− q˜
q˜ (1− q˜)
∂q˜
∂ψj
. (105)
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Noticing p˜ > q˜ and plugging (7) and (8) into (105) yields
∂H(p˜, q˜)
∂ψ0
= (1− p) ln
p˜ (1− q˜)
q˜ (1− p˜)
− (1− q)
p˜− q˜
q˜ (1− q˜)
< (1− p)
[
p˜ (1− q˜)
q˜ (1− p˜)
−1
]
−
(1− q) (p˜− q˜)
q˜ (1− q˜)
(106)
=
p˜− q˜
q˜
(
1− p
1− p˜
−
1− q
1− q˜
)
, (107)
and
∂H(p˜, q˜)
∂ψ1
= −p ln
p˜ (1− q˜)
q˜ (1− p˜)
+ q
p˜− q˜
q˜ (1− q˜)
(108)
< −p
[
1−
q˜ (1− p˜)
p˜ (1− q˜)
]
+ q
p˜− q˜
q˜ (1− q˜)
(109)
=
p˜− q˜
1− q˜
(
−
p
p˜
+
q
q˜
)
, (110)
where (106) and (109) are due to the fact that lnx < x− 1 and lnx > 1− 1/x for all x > 1.
According to Assumption 1, we know that p > q, and therefore, by employing (7) and (8), we can
obtain
p
p˜
=
p
(1− ψ0 − ψ1) p+ ψ0
≥
q
(1− ψ0 − ψ1) q + ψ0
=
q
q˜
,
and
1− p
1− p˜
=
1
1− ψ0 + ψ1
p
1−p
≤
1
1− ψ0 + ψ1
q
1−q
=
1− q
1− q˜
,
which yields
∂H(p˜, q˜)
∂ψ0
< 0 and
∂H(p˜, q˜)
∂ψ1
< 0, (111)
by employing (107) and (110). Similarly, we can prove ∇ΨH(q˜, p˜) ≺ 0, and hence, ∇Ψλˆi (Ψ) ≻ 0, i =
0, 1.
Next, we will just prove 2) for ψ
(λˆ)
1 , and the proof for ψ
(λˆ)
0 is similar.
It is clear that{
ψ1|λˆi (Ψ) ≤ κi with ψ0 = 0, i = 0, 1
}
⊂
{
ψ1|∃ψ0, s.t. λˆi (Ψ) ≤ κi, i = 0, 1
}
. (112)
On the other hand, since we have already proven
∂λˆi(Ψ)
∂ψ0
> 0, we know that if λˆi ([ψ0, ψ1]) ≤ κi, i = 0, 1,
then λˆi ([0, ψ1]) < λˆi ([ψ0, ψ1]) ≤ κi, i = 0, 1, which yields{
ψ1|λˆi (Ψ) ≤ κi with ψ0 = 0, i = 0, 1
}
⊃
{
ψ1|∃ψ0, s.t. λˆi (Ψ) ≤ κi, i = 0, 1
}
. (113)
Therefore, we can obtain{
ψ1|∃ψ0, s.t. λˆi (Ψ) ≤ κi, i = 0, 1
}
=
{
ψ1|λˆi (Ψ) ≤ κi with ψ0 = 0, i = 0, 1
}
, (114)
28
which implies that (85) is true.
Furthermore, since we have already proven
∂λˆi(Ψ)
∂ψ1
> 0, by the definitions of ψ1,λˆ0 and ψ1,λˆ1 , we can
obtain
sup
{
ψ1|λˆi ([0, ψ1]) ≤ κi i = 0, 1
}
= min
{
ψ1,λˆ0 , ψ1,λˆ1
}
,
which completes the proof for (86).
In order to prove (87), we first define a quantity
d1,0
∆
=
∂λˆ0([0, ψ1])
∂ψ1
∣∣∣∣∣
ψ1=0
> 0. (115)
From (7), (8), (80) and (108), it is easy to see that
∂λˆ0([0,ψ1])
∂ψ1
is a continuous function with respect to
ψ1. Thus, there exists ζ1,0 > 0 such that if ψ1 < ζ1,0, then
∂λˆ0([0, ψ1])
∂ψ1
∈
(
d1,0
2
,
3d1,0
2
)
. (116)
Since λˆ0 ([0, 0]) = 0, we can obtain that if κ0 <
d1,0
2 ζ1,0, then ψ1,λˆ0 < ζ1,0, and moreover,
ψ1,λˆ0 <
2
d1,0
κ0 ≤
2
d1,0
κ. (117)
Similarly, there exist two constants d1,1 and ζ1,1 such that if κ1 <
d1,1
2 ζ1,1, then ψ1,λˆ1 <
2
d1,1
κ, which
implies that if κ < ζ
(1)
λˆ
, then
ψ
(λˆ)
1 = min
{
ψ1,λˆ0 , ψ1,λˆ1
}
< c
(1)
λˆ
κ, (118)
where ζ
(1)
λˆ
and c
(1)
λˆ
are defined as
ζ
(1)
λˆ
, min
{
d1,0
2
ζ1,0,
d1,1
2
ζ1,1
}
, (119)
and c
(1)
λˆ
, max
{
2
d1,0
,
2
d1,1
}
. (120)
Analogous to (119) and (120), there exist two constants ζ
(0)
λˆ
and c
(0)
λˆ
, such that if κ < ζ
(0)
λˆ
, then
ψ
(λˆ)
0 = min
{
ψ0,λˆ0 , ψ0,λˆ1
}
< c
(0)
λˆ
κ. (121)
Therefore, by defining
ζλˆ , min
{
ζ
(0)
λˆ
, ζ
(1)
λˆ
}
and cλˆ , max
{
c
(0)
λˆ
, c
(1)
λˆ
}
, (122)
we obtain (87) from (118) and (121).
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We first prove 1). By employing (74) and (76), we can obtain
Tˆ
(0)
E (Ψ)− Tˆ
(0)
L (Ψ) = f (Ψ) ln
1
β∗
, (123)
with f (Ψ) ,
{
(1− 2q˜) [ln p˜− ln(1− p˜)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
G(q˜,p˜)
}−1
−
1
H(q˜, p˜)
. (124)
Notice that
G(q˜, p˜)−H(q˜, p˜) = (1− 2q˜) ln
p˜
1− p˜
− q˜ ln
q˜
p˜
+ (1− q˜) ln
1− q˜
1− p˜
= −
[
(1− q˜) ln
1− q˜
p˜
+ q˜ ln
q˜
1− p˜
]
, (125)
where the inside of the bracket in (125) is the KL divergence of two Bernoulli distributions, and therefore,
G(q˜, p˜) ≤ H(q˜, p˜), (126)
with equality if and only if p˜+ q˜ = 1. Hence, from (7) and (8), we know that
Tˆ
(0)
E (Ψ)− Tˆ
(0)
L (Ψ) ≥ 0 (127)
with equality if and only if ψ0 = ψ1, which proves 1) for Tˆ
(0)
E (Ψ)− Tˆ
(0)
L (Ψ). The proof for Tˆ
(1)
E (Ψ)−
Tˆ
(1)
L (Ψ) ≥ 0 with equality if and only if ψ0 = ψ1 is similar.
Next, we consider 2). We first prove (94) for Tˆ
(0)
E (Ψ)− Tˆ
(0)
L (Ψ) in the region E¯ ∩{Ψ : ψ1 > ψ0 ≥ 0}.
Denote δ , ψ1 − ψ0 > 0. Under Assumption 1, by employing (7) and (8), we can obtain
p˜ = 1− q˜ − δ. (128)
By taking partial derivative of f (Ψ) with respect to ψj , after some algebra, we can obtain
∂f (Ψ)
∂ψj
=
[
1
H(q˜, p˜)2
p˜− q˜
p˜ (1− p˜)
−
1
G(q˜, p˜)2
1− 2q˜
p˜ (1− p˜)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y1(q˜,δ)
∂p˜
∂ψj
+
[
2
G(q˜, p˜)2
ln
p˜
1− p˜
−
1
H(q˜, p˜)2
ln
p˜ (1− q˜)
q˜ (1− p˜)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y2(q˜,δ)
∂q˜
∂ψj
. (129)
From (128), we know that p˜ < 1− q˜ and 1− 2q˜ > p˜− q˜, and hence
Y1(q˜, δ) < 0, (130)
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since G(q˜, p˜) < H(q˜, p˜) as illustrated in (126).
On the other hand, Y2 (q˜, δ) can be rewritten as
Y2 (q˜, δ) =
1
(1− 2q˜)2H(q˜, p˜)2 ln p˜1−p˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z0(q˜,δ)
[
2H(q˜, p˜)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z1(q˜,δ)
− (1− 2q˜)2 ln
p˜
1− p˜
ln
p˜ (1− q˜)
q˜ (1− p˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z2(q˜,δ)
]
, (131)
which implies
Y2 (q˜, 0) = Z1 (q˜, 0)− Z2 (q˜, 0) = 0. (132)
Furthermore, by taking partial derivative of Z1 (q˜, δ) and Z2 (q˜, δ) with respect to δ, we can obtain
∂Z1 (q˜, δ)
∂δ
= 2H (q˜, 1− q˜ − δ)
∂H (q˜, 1− q˜ − δ)
∂δ
=
4H (q˜, 1− q˜ − δ)
(1− q˜ − δ) (q˜ + δ)
(2q˜ + δ − 1) < 0, (133)
since 2q˜ + δ − 1 = q˜ − p˜ < 0 according to Assumption 2, and
∂Z2 (q˜, δ)
∂δ
= (1− 2q˜)2

ln p˜ (1− q˜)
q˜ (1− p˜)
∂ ln p˜1−p˜
∂δ
+ ln
p˜
1− p˜
∂ ln p˜(1−q˜)q˜(1−p˜)
∂δ


=
−(1− 2q˜)2
(1− q˜ − δ) (q˜ + δ)
(
2 ln
1− q˜ − δ
q˜ + δ
+ ln
1− q˜
q˜
)
, (134)
which yields
dZ (q˜, δ) ,
∂ [Z1 (q˜, δ)− Z2 (q˜, δ)]
∂δ
=
Zd(q˜, δ)
(1− q˜ − δ) (q˜ + δ)
, (135)
with Zd (q˜, δ)
∆
= −4 (1− 2q˜ − δ)H (q˜, 1− q˜ − δ) + (1− 2q˜)2
(
2 ln
1− q˜ − δ
q˜ + δ
+ ln
1− q˜
q˜
)
. (136)
Note that
Zd (q˜, 0) = −(1− 2q˜)
2 ln
1− q˜
q˜
< 0, (137)
since q˜ < 0.5 according to Assumption 2. Hence, from (135), we can obtain that for all q˜ ∈
(
0, 12
)
,
dZ (q˜, 0) = −
(1− 2q˜)2
(1− q˜)q˜
ln
1− q˜
q˜
< 0 (138)
since 1− q˜ > 0 and q˜ > 0.
Define a constant ζ
(0)
0,1
ζ
(0)
0,1 ,
1− 2q
4cλˆ(1− q)
, (139)
where cλˆ is the constant in (87).
By employing Lemma 1, we know that if
κ < min
{
ζλˆ, ζ
(0)
0,1
}
, (140)
31
then ψ0 < cλˆκ and ψ1 < cλˆκ, and therefore, from (8), we can obtain
q˜ = q + (1− q)ψ0 − ψ1q ∈ [q − cλˆκq, q + cλˆκ(1 − q)] (141)
⊂
(
q −
1− 2q
4(1− q)
q,
1
4
+
1
2
q
)
⊂
(
0,
1
2
)
, (142)
where (142) is due to (139) and the fact that 0 < q < 0.5. From (138), we know that dZ (q˜, 0) is a
continuous function with respect to q˜ over q˜ ∈
(
0, 12
)
, and hence, can achieve its maximum d∗Z < 0 over
the closed set [q − cλˆκq, q + cλˆκ(1 − q)], that is,
dZ (q˜, 0) ≤ d
∗
Z < 0,∀q˜ ∈ [q − cλˆκq, q + cλˆκ(1 − q)]. (143)
Notice from (135) that dZ (q˜, δ) is continuous with respect to (q˜, δ). Thus, from (138), we know that
∀q˜ ∈ [q − cλˆκq, q + cλˆκ(1− q)], there exists εq˜ > 0 such that if
(q˜, δ) ∈ (q˜ − εq˜, q˜ + εq˜)× [0, εq˜) (144)
then
dZ (q˜, δ) ∈
(
3
2
dZ (q˜, 0) ,
1
2
dZ (q˜, 0)
)
. (145)
Noting that
[q − cλˆκq, q + cλˆκ(1− q)]⊂
⋃
q˜∈[q−cλˆκq,q+cλˆκ(1−q)]
(q˜ − εq˜, q˜ + εq˜) ,
and the set [q − cλˆκq, q + cλˆκ(1 − q)] is compact, we know that there exist {q˜1, q˜2, ..., q˜M} ⊂ [q −
cλˆκq, q + cλˆκ(1− q)] such that
[q − cλˆκq, q + cλˆκ(1− q)] ⊂
M⋃
i=1
(q˜i − εq˜i , q˜i + εq˜i) . (146)
By defining εZ , min{εq˜1 , εq˜2 , ..., εq˜M }, we can obtain from (145) that if δ ∈ [0, εZ), then ∀q˜ ∈
[q − cλˆκq, q + cλˆκ(1− q)],
dZ (q˜, δ) <
1
2
dZ (q˜, 0) ≤
1
2
d∗Z < 0. (147)
Let ζ
(1)
0,1 denote a constant
ζ
(1)
0,1 ,
εZ
cλˆ
. (148)
If κ < min{ζλˆ, ζ
(0)
0,1 , ζ
(1)
0,1}, then by employing Lemma 1, we can obtain that ∀Ψ ∈ E¯∩{Ψ : ψ1 > ψ0 ≥ 0},
ψ0 ∈ [0, εZ) and ψ1 ∈ [0, εZ), (149)
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and hence, δ = ψ1 − ψ0 ∈ (0, εZ), which implies that ∀q˜ ∈ [q − cλˆκq, q + cλˆκ(1− q)] and ∀δ ∈ (0, εZ),
by employing Taylor’s theorem, there exists a δ˜ ∈ (0, δ) such that
Z1 (q˜, δ)− Z2 (q˜, δ) = [Z1 (q˜, 0)− Z2 (q˜, 0)] + dZ(q˜, δ˜)δ = dZ(q˜, δ˜)δ ≤
1
2
d∗Zδ < 0 (150)
from (132) and (147). As a result, by employing (131), we can obtain
Y2 (q˜, δ) = Z0 (q˜, δ) (Z1 (q˜, δ)− Z2 (q˜, δ)) < 0, (151)
since Z0 (q˜, δ) > 0 which is a consequence of p˜ > 0.5 > q˜ according to Assumption 2.
Furthermore, from (7) and (8), we can obtain
∂p˜
ψ0
= −
∂q˜
ψ1
= 1− p and
∂q˜
ψ0
= −
∂p˜
ψ1
= p. (152)
Therefore, by defining
ζ0,1 = min{ζλˆ, ζ
(0)
0,1 , ζ
(1)
0,1}, (153)
and by employing (123), (129), (130), (151) and (152), we know that if κ < ζ0,1, then in the region
E¯ ∩ {Ψ : ψ1 > ψ0 ≥ 0},
∂
[
Tˆ
(0)
E (Ψ)− Tˆ
(0)
L (Ψ)
]
∂ψ0
= [(1− p)Y1(q˜, δ) + pY2(q˜, δ)] ln
1
β∗
< 0, (154)
and
∂
[
Tˆ
(0)
E (Ψ)− Tˆ
(0)
L (Ψ)
]
∂ψ1
= − [pY1(q˜, δ) + (1− p)Y2(q˜, δ)] ln
1
β∗
> 0, (155)
since β∗ < 1, which complete the proof of (94) for Tˆ
(0)
E (Ψ)− Tˆ
(0)
L (Ψ) .
By following a similar approach as above, we can show that in the region E¯ ∩ {Ψ : 0 ≤ ψ1 < ψ0},
there exists a constant ζ0,0 such that if κ < ζ0,0, then (95) for Tˆ
(0)
E (Ψ) − Tˆ
(0)
L (Ψ) is true. Let ζ
(0)
obj ,
min{ζ0,0, ζ0,1}.
Furthermore, we can similarly prove that there exists a constant ζ
(1)
obj such that if κ < ζ
(1)
obj, then the
corresponding results in (94) and (95) for Tˆ
(1)
E (Ψ)− Tˆ
(1)
L (Ψ) are true. For the sake of brevity, the details
of these proofs are omitted. Finally, we can conclude the proof for 2) by defining
ζobj , min
{
ζ
(0)
obj, ζ
(1)
obj
}
. (156)
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